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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RONALD EDDINGTON,
Petitioner/Appellant,
-vsSTATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 44353
Case No. CV PC 15 16861
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for
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Hon. Lynn Norton, District Judge
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Respondent summarily argues that the District Court correctly dismissed all of Mr.
Eddington's claims summarily and without a hearing. However, Respondent provided very little
analysis or argument to support its position.

As thoroughly discussed in Mr. Eddington's

opening brief, Mr. Eddington set forth eight (8) different ways, collectively and/or individually,
that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. Nevertheless, Respondent selected only
two (2) relatively small issues out of Mr. Eddington's eight (8) specific and well documented
reasons that his trial counsel was ineffective. The two (2) problematic issues singled out by
Respondent are only a small fraction of the collective errors resulting the deprivation of Mr.
Eddington receiving his constitutionally guaranteed effective assistance of counsel. Other than
the conclusory assertion that the District Court "correctly" dismissed Mr. Eddington's claims,
Respondent fails to address the majority of Mr. Eddington's concerns set forth in his opening
brief.
Moreover, even though Respondent requested two (2) separate extensions delaying this
matter approximately sixty (60) days while Mr. Eddington remains incarcerated, Respondent's
substantive briefing turned out to be only eleven (11) pages (not including signature page and
attached exhibit).

II.

ARGUMENT

As stated previously, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition
allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not
be summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004);
Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct.App. 2008). Consequently, if a
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genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve
the factual issues. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629.
Just as in civil summary judgment motions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56, all inferences must be
liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

Claims may only be summarily

dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven by the record of the criminal
proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each
essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter of
law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushe v. State, 146
Idaho 599,603,200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009).
Respondent Completely Ignored the Fact that Mr. Eddington was Deprived Effective
Assistance of Counsel Because His Trial Counsel Was Operating Under an Actual Conflict of
Interest. Notably, Respondent failed to discuss Mr. Eddington's extensive briefing, reasoning
and analyis regarding the glaring conflict of interest of Mr. Eddington's trial counsel (roughly 35
pages of the 50 page brief). In fact, the words "conflict of interest" do not even appear anywhere
in the Respondent's brief (other than in the District Court's decision attached as an exhibit). It is
unclear as to why Respondent refused to discuss the central issues in this case. What is clear,
however, is that it is essential that this Court not take Respondent's lead and simply ignore the
fact Mr. Eddington was denied his Sixth Amendment right to conflict free and effective
assistance of counsel. Mr. Eddington's recitation of the facts, his application of the law and his
extensive analysis deserve a full and fair review.
Interestingly, by ignoring the obvious actual conflict of interest in the underlying criminal
case, Respondent was able to pretend a higher standard applied in this matter. Nevertheless,
pursuant to Idaho law, if a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting
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interests, there is a high probability of prejudice arising from multiple concurrent representation.
Sparks v. State, 92 P.3d 542, 548, 140 Idaho 292, 298 (Idaho App. 2004). In a nutshell, the
Idaho Court of Appeals has held that the second prong of the Strickland test demonstrating
prejudice is presumed in such conflict of interest cases. Id. Instead, in order to establish a
violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a defendant must
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. See
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).
To demonstrate an "actual conflict," a defendant must first show that his counsel actively
represented conflicting interests and second, that the conflict adversely affected his counsel's
performance. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350; Chippewa v. State, 156 Idaho 915,921,332 P.3d 827,833
(2014). See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (Actual conflict is defined by its effect
on counsel, not by whether there is a "mere theoretical division of loyalties").

Please see

Appellant's Opening Brief pps. 14-21 for detailed analysis of Mr. Bartlett's actual conflict of
interest.
To establish an adverse effect, the petition must: (1) identify a plausible alternative
defense strategy or tactic; (2) show that the alternative strategy or tactic was objectively
reasonable; and (3) show that defense counsel's failure to pursue that strategy or tactic was linked
to the actual conflict. Chippewa, 156 Idaho at 919-22, 332 P.3d at 831-34. Although not binding
authority, it is certainly instructive that in the

ih Circuit, "a defendant can establish ineffective

assistance of counsel by showing that his attorney pressured him to plead guilty because of the
attorney's conflict of interest." Daniels v. United States. 54 F.3d 290,295 (7th Cir.1995).
Notably, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
[I]n a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil-it
bears repeating-is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to
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6

refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial
plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. It may be possible
in some cases to indentify from the record the prejudice resulting
from an attorney's failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even
with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be
difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the
attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a
conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions
in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible!' HollowBy v.
Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S., at 490 -491.
For the same reasons as cited above, it would typically be futile to attempt to determine
precisely how counsel's conduct would have been different had he not been under conflicting
duties. For that reason, a petitioner need only demonstrate that a conflict of interest actually
affected the adequacy of his lawyer's performance. Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho at 296.
It is undisputed that Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Eddington's trial counsel, represented Mr.

Eddington and Diana Eddington ("Diana") (Mr. Eddington's mother) at the same time on related
felony criminal cases. It is undisputed that Mr. Bartlett never discussed the conflict of interest
with either Mr. Eddington nor Diana. It is undisputed that Mr. Bartlett never had anyone sign a
waiver of the conflict of interest. It is undisputed that Mr. Bartlett refused to permit Diana to
testify on her son's behalf due to the conflict of interest. R. 15-19; R. 224-228. It is undisputed
that Mr. Bartlett refused to permit Diana to write a a letter in support of her son due to the
conflict of interest. R. 16; R. 137; R. 225-226. It is undisputed that Diana's felony charge would
not be dismissed until AFTER Mr. Eddington plead guilty. R. 14-19; R. 222-228; R. 136. It is
undisputed that Mr. Bartlett forcefully insisted that Mr. Eddington take a plea agreement he was
not comfortable with so that Diana's felony charge would be dismissed. R. 24-27.
However, Mr. Bartlett's prioritizing of Diana's claim over Mr. Eddington's best interests
did not stop there. Rather, Mr. Bartlett's divided loyalties and conflict of interest even interfered
with his putting forth a defense for Mr. Eddington at his sentencing in an effort to avoid
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jeopardizing the dismissal of Diana's case. R. 25-27.

During the course of the sentencing

hearing, Mr. Bartlett objected a total of seven (7) times. Of those objections, four (4) applied
directly to the prosecution's mention of Diana Eddington's case. R. 32-44.
As thoroughly discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief, summary dismissal is
permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that,
if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the relief requested. If such a
factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing !!ill!! be conducted. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho
517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushev. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148,
1152 (2009) (emphasis added). Id.
Clearly, as evidenced by the undisputed facts, Mr. Bartlett's actual conflict in
representing both Mr. Eddington and Diana affected the adequacy of Mr. Bartlett's
representation of Mr. Eddington. If the District Court did not want to out right reverse the
conviction/sentence based on this uncontroverted evidence, at the very least Mr. Eddington
deserved an evidentiary hearing on these issues pursuant to Idaho law.

III.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Eddington provided more than enough unrebutted and admissible evidence in
support of his claims. Mr. Eddington should be granted summary disposition of his PCRM in his
favor.

In the alternative, the case should be remanded so that Mr. Eddington can have the

evidentiary hearing that he is entitled to pursuant to the law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

f

~y of February, 2017.

SMITH HORRAS P.A.

~Y-J

Ellen N. Smith, of the Firm
Attorneys for Appellant, Ronald Eddington
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

ih day of February, 2017, I caused two true

and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaed, addressed to:
JOHN C. McKINNEY
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL LAW DIVISION
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0010

Ellen Smith, Attorney for Appellant
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